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THE DETERMINATION OF TITLE TO SUBMERGED
LANDS ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS
American Indians have long realized that the gap between their theoretical
rights and the real world is a larger one than for most Americans.'
The treatment of submerged lands within Indian reservations provides a
classic example of the Indian rights gap. Two possible owners may claim
such lands under navigable water: the tribe or one of the several states.
Substantial legal and economic significance attaches to ownership. The
title may determine fishing rights2 as well as potentially lucrative mineral
rights to gas and oil deposits. 3 When a river is rerouted, the uncovered land
may become a valuable recreational or commercial waterfront. 4 Title can
also determine criminal jurisdiction for acts taking place on the water.5
States rely on the equal footing doctrine to claim title to submerged
lands.6 Under this doctrine, as Congress created each state, the state
received title to the submerged lands. In most of the western United States,
however, Indian reservations predated the states. Title may, therefore, have
been transferred to the tribe at the creation of the reservation under theories
of Indian treaty construction. 7 Even in the absence of preexisting reserva-
tions, Indians may claim title to homelands that preceded the formation of
the United States itself under the theory of aboriginal title.8
The Supreme Court has been inconsistent in analyzing the issue of title
when state and tribal governments present conflicting claims. 9 It has not
clearly resolved the circumstances in which the presence of a reservation
1. Merrill, Aboriginal Water Rights, 20 NAT. RESOURCEs J. 45, 69 (1980). See generally V.
DELORIA, JR. & C. LyraE, AmsucAN INDIANs, AMERiCAN JUSTICE (1983); DOCUMENTS OF UNrED
STATES I~ioAN POLICY (F. Pruch ed. 1975).
2. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
3. See Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970).
4. See Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 717 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1049 (1984). See generally Homeowners are Enraged by Tribe's Eviction Threat, Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, Aug. 22, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
5. See Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
6. This includes submerged lands within Indian reservations. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1,
26 (1894). See generally F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDiAN LAw 501-07 (1982 ed.) [hereinafter
F COHEN]; infra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
7. See Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 87 (1922).
8. See infra notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
9. Seven Supreme Court decisions concerning navigable waters on reservations appear to create
separate lines of authority. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Choctaw Nation v.
Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926); Brewer-Elliott
Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922); Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78
(1918); Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913); United States v. W'mans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
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should create an exception to the equal footing doctrine's presumption of
state ownership of navigable water. As a result, lower courts have been
forced to develop jurisprudence without clear guidance. 10 In the process
stare decisis has not, wielded its usual force.
The clarification of this situation involves examination of the policy
issues behind the apparently conflicting theories. First, where aboriginal
title is proven, Indian rights should prevail. Where such title is not at issue,
the presence of a reservation should nonetheless trigger a presumptive
exception to the equal footing doctrine. Not only would this presumption of
tribal ownership give clear guidance to lower courts, it would help reduce
the gap between the Indians' theoretical and realized rights.
I. FACTORS IN THE DETERMINATION OF TITLE TO
SUBMERGED LANDS
A. Aboriginal Title
Aboriginal title may provide a basis for Indians to assert a claim to
submerged lands, premised on a determination that the United States itself
never obtained complete title and thus could not pass it to the states. 1 The
doctrine of title to ancestral homelands does not involve treaty interpreta-
tion, but relies upon the Indians' original right of occupancy. It is therefore
an appropriate ground for Indian ownership only when navigable water
beds are located on ancestral tribal homelands.
1. The Evolution of Indian Title
Aboriginal or Indian title is based on the principle that when the white
man "discovered" America, the country was already inhabited. The Su-
preme Court has long recognized the Indians' preexisting claim to their
homelands. In 1832, Chief Justice Marshall indicated that the Indian
10. See infra notes 35-45, 166-88 and accompanying text.
I1. The Supreme Court has not recognized an aboriginal title right to submerged lands. See United
States v. Pend Oreille County Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 585 F. Supp. 606 (E.D. Wash. 1984); infra notes
39-41 and accompanying text. The concept of aboriginal title, however, has been applied to support
claims to other Indian lands. In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court confirmed federal jurisdiction
on a claim against New York based on aboriginal title. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida,
N.Y., 414 U.S. 661 (1974) (Oneida 1). The tribe brought suit for rental value of land ceded to New York
in 1795 without federal consent. The district and appellate courts found no federal jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court reversed, stating that the case "rests on the not insubstantial claim that federal law now
protects, and has continuously protected from the time of the formation of the United States, possessory
right to tribal lands." Id. at 677. The Court affirmed the federal common law right of aboriginal title in
County of Oneida. N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation, 105 S. Ct. 1245 (1985) (Oneida 11). The Court
explicitly held that Indians have a right to sue in federal court to establish their aboriginal title, which
could not be terminated without the consent of Congress. Id. at 1247-48.
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nations had always been considered as distinct and independent political
communities. 12 They retained their original natural rights as "the un-
disputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial," subject only to the
exclusive right to treaty granted by mutual agreement among the coloniz-
ing nations. 13 The task, then, for Marshall and subsequent justices, was to
interpret those natural rights in light of the later behavior of the white
settlers and the government of the United States. Numerous cases of this
type came before the Court in the late 1800's and early 1900's.
The Supreme Court defined the Indian right as the right of occupancy
only, 14 but held it to be "as sacred as the fee-simple of the whites.'
15
Further, the Court held that the right of occupancy need not necessarily
have been recognized in any statute or formal governmental action in order
to be enforced. 16 However, the Court held that Congress has absolute power
to extinguish the right of occupancy,17 and has no legal obligation to
compensate the tribe. 18 Unless Congress has exercised that power, Indian
title takes precedence over federal land grants. 19 The Court also held that if
land was subject to Indian title, a grant to other parties from the government
would transfer no beneficial interest. 20 Indian title is "[t]he right of per-
petual and exclusive occupancy of the land [and] is not less valuable than
full title in fee." 21
2. Prior Supreme Court Cases Involving Submerged Lands
Of the Supreme Court cases involving title to submerged laids on
reservations, the Court touched upon the involvement of aboriginal title in
only three.22 In these cases the Court displayed an unwillingness to carefully
12. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), modified by Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) (as stated inNew Mexico v. Mescalero ApacheTribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983)).
13. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559. The colonizers granted the right to treaty with a tribe to the nation
"discovering" the territory inhabited by the tribe.
14. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543,587 (1823) (The white man's "discovery gave an
exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest.
15. Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835).
16. Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923).
17. See Oneida 1, 414 U.S. at 669; accord United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978).
18. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955).
19. E.g., Buttzv. Northern Pac. R.R., 119 U.S. 55 (1886); United States v. SantaFePac. R.R., 314
U.S. 339 (1941).
20. United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111, 116 (1938).
21. Id. The Court echoed Marshall and Baldwin, see supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text, in
declaring Indian title to be as secure and sacred as fee simple absolute for the Indians, who were
"undisturbed possessors of the soil from time immemorial." Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. at 117.
22. See supra note 9 for the list of reservation submerged lands cases. The other six cases did not
involve aboriginal homelands. In Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 86 (1918), the
reservation had been created by Congress for a Canadian tribe. In Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v.
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explore Indian rights and to enunciate them clearly. For example, the Court
might have decided United States v. Winans23 on the basis of aboriginal
title, and reference to the concept was made briefly.24 The force of the
opinion, however, centered upon treaty interpretation. 25 United States v.
Holt State Bank26 also indisputably involved aboriginal lands, and Mon-
tana v. United States27 apparently did so. 28 Again, the Court did not
squarely face the issue.
The fact situation in Holt Bank was somewhat unusual. The controversy
over title arose only as the federal government was about to divide and sell
the last of the tribal land. 29 The opinion did not dwell on the "sacred" tribal
right to occupancy defined by the Mitchel Court almost a century before,30
or on the fact that the reservation was the last remnant of the tribe's
aboriginal land. The Court decided the case in favor of the state under the
equal footing doctrine. 31
Similarly, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts in Montana32
without specifically mentioning an aboriginal title claim, despite lower
court reliance on the doctrine. 33 The Court failed to address the issue,
United States, 260 U.S. 77, 80 n. 1 (1922), the Osage tribe resettled in Oklahoma from east of the
Mississippi River. The Choctaws, Cherokees, and Chickasaws in Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397
U.S. 620 (1970), were also resettled from their aboriginal territory. The opinion did mention the Indian
title right surrendered in agreeing to move to Oklahoma, id. at 623, but this fact did not affect the
outcome of the case. The Indians living on the Hoopa Valley Reservation were not on their traditional
homeland as discussed in Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 268-69 (1913).
23. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
24. In Winans, the characterization of a treaty as a grant of rights from a tribe, and not a grant to it,
is a reference to aboriginal title. Id. at 381. The Court held that the Yakima tribe had reserved the right to
fish in disputed areas, as they had traditionally done, subject to the treaty restrictions. This right was
recently affirmed in Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658 (1979).
25. Winans, 198 U.S. at 377-81.
26. 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
27. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
28. F. COHEN, supra note 6, at 505 (both Montana and Holt Bank involved aboriginal title land).
29. Holt Bank, 270 U.S. at 52.
30. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
31. Political implications probably led to the Court's position. See infra notes 106-16 and accom-
panying text.
32. Montana, 450 U.S. at 556-57.
33. United States v. Finch, 395 F. Supp. 205, 209 (D. Mont. 1975). The district court in Montana
had considered aboriginal title an important factor in deciding in favor of tribal ownership. The Indian
Claims Commission also considered aboriginal title in its decision for the tribe. Crow Tribe v. United
States, 3 Indian Claims Comm'n 147, 151 (1954). The Montana opinion began: "The Crow Indians
originated in Canada, but some three centuries ago they migrated to what is now southern Montana."
450 U.S. at 544-47. This reference may have been an attempt to deny aboriginal title. See F. COHEN,
supra note 6, at 503. Yet two centuries of occupation prior to treaty should have been sufficient to
establish title. Id.
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deciding instead that the equal footing doctrine mandated a decision in
favor of the state.34
3. Recent District Court Opinions: Yankton and Pend Oreille
Although the Supreme Court has yet to acknowledge the legitimacy of
aboriginal title claims to submerged lands, two recent district court opin-
ions directly considered the issue. The first was Yankton Sioux Tribe of
Indians v. Nelson.35 In Yankton, a treaty created the reservation, which
included Lake Andes, in 1858.36 The Yankton court first distinguished the
earlier Supreme Court decisions that had failed to recognize the aboriginal
right as cases in which the Indian right to occupancy had been extinguished
prior to the creation of the reservation. 37 The court then held that the Sioux
treaty did not expressly extinguish the tribe's aboriginal title to Lake
Andes. Thus, the United States had no title to pass to South Dakota upon its
admission to the Union.38
The second district court opinion, United States v. Pend Oreille County
Public Utility District No. 1,39 confronted the question in a context lacking
34. Montana, 450 U.S. at 556-57. If the Court had recognized aboriginal title, a decision in favor
of the state would have been difficult. One analysis of the case attributes the break with precedent and
disregard of the treaty rules to political considerations, not legal analysis. Wilkinson, Cragun & Barker,
Review of Developments in Indian Law in the Courts (Oct. 11, 1981) (unpublished paper prepared for the
National Congress of American Indians Convention)(copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
35. 521 F. Supp. 463 (D.S.D. 1981), vacated, 683 F.2d 1160 (8th Cir. 1982).
36. Id. at 464. The treaty recited that the tribe ceded all its land "except four hundred thousand
acres." Lake Andes was inside the retained area. Id.
37. Id. at 465. These determinations are questionable. The Indian right had been extinguished in
Choctaw, 397 U.S. 620; it is notclearthatit was extinguished inMontana, 450 U.S. 544, orHoltBank,
270 U.S. 49. The statement in Yankton that the reservation in Montana was conveyed to the tribe is an
accurate reflection of the Supreme Court opinion in Montana. The evidence that the Montana Court
cited to show that conveyance, however, was itself dubious. The treaty clause "that such land would be
set apart for the. . . use and occupation. . . [of the tribe],"' Montana, 450 U.S. at 553, may not
connote an unambiguous conveyance from the government to the tribe which extinguished all preexist-
ing rights. It can be read merely as a recognition of the tribe's right to occupancy because of its Indian
title to the land in question. The Yankton court, in its attempt to reach the aboriginal title issue, also
twisted Holt Bank in a clearly erroneous way in order to distinguish it. The tribe signed two treaties
before the admission of the state to the Union. Treaty with the Chippewas, September 30, 1854, 10 STAT.
1109; Treaty with the Chippewas, February 22, 1855, 10 STAT. 1165. These did not cede all the land to
the government as the Yankton court claimed. 521 F. Supp. at 466. The Court expressly stated in Holt
Bank that the effect of these treaties.was to reserve in a general way "what remained of their aboriginal
territory; and thus it came to be known and recognized as a reservation." 270 U.S. at 58. Justice
Douglas in Choctaw distinguished Holt Bank as involving "only the aboriginal Indian title of use and
occupancy." Choctaw, 397 U.S. at 639. But see infra note 132 (Stevens in concurrence in Montana,
stating that Douglas applied Holt Bank to Choctaw).
38. Yankton, 521 F. Supp. at 466.
39. 585 F. Supp. 606 (E.D. Wash. 1984).
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a treaty grant to bolster the tribe's claim. In that case, the United States and
the Kalispel tribe claimed tribal ownership of the Pend Oreille River on the
basis of aboriginal title.40 The county and state moved for summary
judgment on the ground that because Congress had not expressly conveyed
the submerged lands to the tribe, the title went to the state upon its
admission to the Union. The court noted that this was a question of first
impression. No court had ever squarely addressed the issue of competing
claims by an Indian tribe and a state to the same navigable waters, where
the Indian claim was based on aboriginal title. 41 The court reviewed the line
of cases involving state ownership of navigable water, the "separate and
distinct" line of cases involving aboriginal title, 42 and found that aboriginal
title was not extinguished by the equal footing doctrine. 43 The court denied
the motion for summary judgment,44 and held that if the tribe could
establish aboriginal title, it would have a current right to occupancy and use
of the bed and banks of the river where it flows through the ancestral
lands. 45 The state would have a fee title to the beds and banks, burdened by
the tribe's beneficial interests and the United States' navigable servitude.46
4. Future Application
Aboriginal title for most tribal lands has probably been extinguished by
treaty or termination of the tribe.47 Nonetheless, if a tribe could prove
aboriginal title, and if that proof resolved the issue of land title in favor of
the tribe, many practical advantages would be obtained in any attempt to
further establish title to submerged lands. Aboriginal title avoids the
problem of distinguishing navigable from nonnavigable water. It avoids the
question of dates, since aboriginal title predates the origin of all the states.
In addition, only Congress has authority to extinguish aboriginal title. 48
40. Id. at 608.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. The court characterized the equal footing cases as establishing a presumption against
conveyance; however, aboriginal title does not involve a conveyance, but rather "a pre-existing interest
held by the tribes." Id. at 609. The court indicated that even if the presumption were applicable, a
countervailing presumption existed in the tribe's favor. Id. at 610.
44. Id. (citing Choctaw, 397 U.S. at 634).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See supra note 22.
48. The Ninth Circuit recently held that the Indian Claims Commission did not have jurisdiction to
extinguish aboriginal title. United States v. Dann, 706 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds,
105 S. Ct. 1058 (1985). This could be a powerful tool for tribes who were given a cash settlement by the
commission for lost aboriginal lands.
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The Supreme Court has not clearly recognized aboriginal title in this
context, and thus the first step in the submerged lands title inquiry has
instead been a determination of navigability.
B. Navigability
A threshold issue in determining title to submerged lands is the navi-
gability of the waterway. If the land underlies nonnavigable water, the
riparian land owners have title.4 9 Tribes, like other riparian owners, own all
the beds of nonnavigable waters bounded or surrounded by tribally owned
lands. The issue of the equal footing doctrine arises only if the water is
navigable.
Under English common law, the sovereign holds the title to navigable
waterway beds.50 When the American colonies declared independence, the
rights of the sovereign passed to each state, subject only to the rights
subsequently surrendered in the Constitution. The title to beds of navigable
waterways thus passed to the individual states. 51
The English define navigable waterways as those affected by tides. 52
This works quite well for England, because all significant rivers in England
are tidal. Since the original states were coastal, most waters were also
affected by tides, and the early states easily adopted the English common
law definition of navigability. Later states, however, adapted the definition
of navigability to conditions in other areas of the United States where many
of the significant waterways were not tidal. Through the nineteenth century,
each state supreme court defined the elements of navigability for the
purpose of determining title to submerged lands within its borders. 53 In the
1920's, the United States Supreme Court decided the Brewer-Holt-Utah
trilogy,54 which established that navigability for the purpose of determining
title was a federal question to be decided by federal courts. 55 Under the
federal test, if a waterway was usable for commerce at the time the state was
49. Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 591-92 (1922). See generally . CoHEN, supra note 6, at
501.
50. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894).
51. Id. at 16. The land was, and is, subject to the restriction by the federal government that
waterways remain free for commerce. This restriction is known as the navigational servitude.
52. Id. at 42.
53. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243,262 (1913); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 337-38
(1877). See generally Johnson & Austin, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds on Western Lakes and
Streams, 7 NAT. REsoURcas J. 1, 7 (1967) [hereinafter Johnson & Austin].
54. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49
(1926); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77 (1922). See Johnson & Austin,
supra note 53, at 8-10 (grouping the three cases as a trilogy).
55. Johnson & Austin, supra note 53, at 9.
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admitted to the Union, or at the time the reservation was founded, it was
navigable in law. 56
Determination of navigability is a simple issue for most rivers and lakes.
However, since the critical date is the creation of the reservation or the state,
usually a nineteenth century event, the condition of navigability may have
changed significantly. The court must therefore examine the historical
record to determine if the water was or could have been used for commerce
at the earlier date.57 The court will address the issue of state or tribal title
only if it determines that the water was navigable at the critical date. Even
as to the relatively straightforward subject of navigability, however, the
Supreme Court has not issued a clear, consistent line of authority.
Some of the early cases decided on the basis of nonnavigability also
included dicta as to how the Court would have decided the case if the water
were navigable. 58 Later cases erroneously cited these nonnavigability cases
as controlling in opinions concerning navigable water.59 For example, in
Donnelly v. United States,60 a case involving a reservation on the Klamath
River, the Court determined ownership on grounds of nonnavigability. 61
This finding of nonnavigability resolved the question of ownership in favor
of the tribe. Subsequent Supreme Court opinions, however, have cited
Donnelly as authority in deciding cases involving navigable water, because
the Court noted that the description, "a tract of country one mile in width
on each side of the Klamath River," appeared sufficient to include owner-
ship of the river bed. 62 The Court then went on to examine the reservation's
purpose.63
56. A full statement of the test is whether the water in its natural and ordinary condition was usable
as a highway for commerce by the customary modes of trade or travel on water when the state was
admitted to the Union. See Holt Bank, 270 U.S. at 56; Johnson & Austin, supra note 53, at 16.
57. See Holt Bank, 270 U.S. at 56-57.
58. E.g., Brewer, 260 U.S. at 87.
59. E.g., Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620,632-33 (1970); see also id. at 651 (White,
J., dissenting) (pointing out error).
60. 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
61. Donnelly, 228 U.S. at 264. Since this case preceded the Court's determination that navigability
for title purposes is a federal question, the determination of navigability fell to the state. Thus the Court
held that navigability in fact was irrelevant since California had declared that section of the river
nonnavigable.
62. Id. at 259.
63. Id. By so doing, the Court appeared to advocate a treaty interpretation approach to submerged
lands adjudication. See infra Part I.D. The Court observed:
It seems to us clear that if the United States was the owner of the river bed, a reasonable
construction of this language requires that the river be considered as included within the reserva-
tion. Indeed, in view of all the circumstances, it would be absurd to treat the order as intended to
include the uplands to the width of one mile on each side of the river, and at the same time to
exclude the river. As a matter of history it plainly appears that the Klamath Indians established
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In Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States,64 the United States
sued to quiet title in the United States as trustee for the tribe.65 Because the
district court determined that the Arkansas River was not navigable as a
finding of fact,66 the Supreme Court found that the tribe held the title. 67 The
Brewer Court decided the case solely on the grounds of nonnavigability;
nonetheless, subsequent opinions have cited Brewer as controlling for
cases involving navigable water. 68 The Brewer Court, citing an earlier case,
stated that the government could grant title to navigable streams under
certain conditions. 69 The Court, however, found it unnecessary to decide
whether Congress had granted such a title here.
C. Equal Footing Doctrine
Once a reservation waterway has been declared navigable, the court must
determine ownership. If the title rests in the state, it is because of the equal
footing doctrine.
The equal footing doctrine required that newly admitted states be ac-
corded the same rights as the original states. 70 Because the original states
64. 260 U.S. 77 (1922). Congress had granted the Osage tribe its reservation prior to granting
statehood to Oklahoma. Id. at 80. The reservation boundary description included the words "the main
channel of the Arkansas River." Id. at 81 n.1. The Oklahoma Supreme Court had held that the river was
navigable and that the title passed to the state. Id. at 87. Oklahoma then granted leases for oil and gas
development. Id. at 79.
65. Brewer, 260 U.S. at 79.
66. The district court held that the title was in the tribe, since the river was and always had been
nonnavigable. Id. at 79-80. The Eighth Circuit affirmed on the basis that the United States had the right
to dispose of the river bed and had done so, whether or not the river was navigable. Id. at 80. Oklahoma
appealed, arguing that the equal footing doctrine prohibited the grant to the tribe, and that therefore the
title to the bed passed to the state upon statehood. Id. at 83. The Supreme Court stated that, if the river
were navigable, the court of appeals position-that the power of the federal government to grant beds of
navigable waters was unrestricted-would be before it. If that was not upheld, then a second question-
whether the grant would satisfy the "public purpose" restriction of Shively-would arise. Id. at 86.
Having asked the questions, which have yet to be clearly answered, the Court said: "We do not find it
necessary to decide either of these questions, in view of the finding as a fact that the Arkansas is and was
not navigable at the place where the river bed lots, here in controversy, are." Id.
67. Id. at 87.
68. E.g., Choctaw, 397 U.S. at 632-33.
69. Brewer, 260 U.S. at 84-85 (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 47 (1894)). The court of
appeals had taken the position that Congress could grant the land for any reason. The Brewer Court
recognized that the federal government could grant beds of navigable water prior to statehood for an
appropriate "public purpose." Brewer, 260"U.S. at 85. The Court stated that the issue of whether the
reservation was an appropriate public purpose underShively was not reached. See infra notes 70-82 and
accompanying text. This question appeared closed after the Winans and Alaska Pacific Fisheries
decisions. See infra notes 146-61 and accompanying text. The Court did not refer to Alaska Pacific
Fisheries' statement that the Shively public purpose requirement was easily satisfied.
70. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26-28,49, 57 (1894). See generally 1 W. HUTCHINS, WATER
RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NNETEEN WESTERN STATES 128-34 (1971) (lands underlying navigable waters); J.
SAx, WATER LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 361-62 (1965) (equal footing claims).
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received title to submerged lands, the later states received like benefits.
Under the doctrine, the federal government held the land in trust until each
state was created, at which time title automatically vested. 7 1 Since the
original colonies held title to submerged lands underlying navigable water-
ways, the Supreme Court, in the seminal case of Shively v. Bowlby, 72 held
that new states were also granted title to submerged lands within their
boundaries.
In Shively, however, the Court also held that, prior to statehood, Con-
gress had the power to grant land underlying navigable waters to entities
other than states whenever necessary. 73 The Court enumerated the circum-
stances under which Congress might make such grants: "in order to
perform international obligations, or to effect the improvement of such
lands for the promotion and convenience of commerce with foreign nations
and among the several States, or to carry out other public purposes
appropriate to the objects for which the United States hold [sic] the
Territory." 74 In a later passage the Court appeared to limit "public pur-
poses" to "international duty or public exigency." 75 The Court indicated
that it would begin with a presumption that title vested in the state upon
admission. 76 Title did not pass by general law. 77 Later courts interpreted
Shively as holding that Congress must be explicit about any contrary
intent.78 The Shively opinion has given rise to much of the confusion
surrounding Indian rights to submerged lands.
First, subsequent opinions disagreed as to whether Indian reservations
fell within the Shively public purpose exception to the equal footing
doctrine. 79 Second, the Shively Court spoke of "public exigencies" that
would justify a private grant. 80 Later opinions have given different mean-
ings to the phrase "public exigencies" as well. Finally, Shively concerned
only the comparative rights of individual landowners, state governments,
and federal governments. It did not involve the question of land ownership
by Indian tribes. This omission has engendered confusion which continues
to the present day. If a court rigidly follows the "express intent" gloss on
Shively,8 it must find an explicit Congressional grant in the treaty in order
71. Shively, 152 U.S. at 27, 49, 57.
72. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
73. Shively, 152 U.S. at 48.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 58.
76. Id. at 26.
77. Id. at 48.
78. See Holt Bank, 270 U.S. at 55.
79. See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
80. Shively, 152 U.S. at 58.
81. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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to transfer title to the tribe rather than to the state. 82 However, since the
question of sovereign rights was not before the Court in Shively, such rigid
adherence is unwarranted without Court confirmation that the Shively
principles extend to sovereign entities, such as Indian tribes. The Court
again has never squarely addressed the question of sovereign rights. As a
result, lower courts have been forced to fashion Indian rights theories of
their own, and Indians have remained unsure of their legal rights. The two
primary elements of Shively causing difficulty are the nature of the grant,
and the nature of the public purpose or exigency.
1. Private or Indian Grant?
In Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States,83 the Supreme Court
touched upon the difference between the private grant at issue in Shively
and a grant to a sovereign tribe. Alaska Pacific Fisheries involved sub-
merged lands around a group of islands set aside for a reservation in
southwestern Alaska. Navigability was not questioned since the water was
tidal. The language of the grant setting the land apart as a reservation was
not specific: "the body of lands known as Annette Islands." 84 The Court
did not hesitate over Congress' power to grant submerged lands, as it might
have under Shively.85 One factor the Court mentioned was that a grant to a
tribe was not technically a private grant. 86 Later Supreme Court cases have
not picked up or developed this theme.87 Instead, the decisions, including
Alaska Pacific Fisheries itself, delve into the public purpose/public ex-
igency question.
2. Public Purpose and Public Exigency
a. The Blanket Exception Approach
In developing Shively's "public purpose" or "public exigency" excep-
tions to the equal footing doctrine, the Supreme Court might have de-
termined that all Indian treaties be deemed Congressional grants of
82. See Holt Bank, 270 U.S. at 55-59.
83. 248 U.S. 78 (1918).
84. Alaska Pac. Fisheries, 248 U.S. at 86.
85. Id. at 87.
86. Id. at 88.
87. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). This presumption against private grants
has been noted, however, by the Ninth Circuit. See Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen,
665 F.2d 951, 961 n.27 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 977 (1982) (characterizing the underlying
rationale for the presumption as of "doubtful relevance to a reservation of land by a sovereign Indian
tribe," since it does not technically involve a "grant").
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prestatehood submerged lands. The public exigencies and purposes behind
all treaties would be peace, coherence, and settlement of the West. 88 In
some cases, the Supreme Court appeared to have taken just such a position.
This view appeared as recently as 1970, in Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma.89
Choctaw's complex fact situation involved three tribes, and the state of
Oklahoma in litigation over three grants, to a portion of the bed of the
Arkansas River.90
The Court, without elaboration, first determined that the first treaty grant
included the section of the river, which was entirely inside the reservation.
The treaty had not mentioned this portion of the river. The Court then
considered the section of the river which divided the lands of the Cherokee
from those of the Choctaw-Chickasaw. These two grants read "up the
Arkansas" and "down the Arkansas" in the boundary description. 91 In a
holding that apparently established a blanket exception to the equal footing
doctrine for reservations, the Court stated that if the United States did not
intend to pass the title to the river to the tribe, it was competent to exclude
it.92 Since the United States had not done so, the title went to the tribe.93
Justice Douglas stated that if the United States intended to retain the river
beds for transfer to the state, it should have specifically mentioned that
intent.94 The Shively presumption of an intent to grant to the state appar-
ently has been stood on its head. Choctaw would instead force Congress to
express its intent to follow the equal footing doctrine when the Indian
reservation "public purpose" exception arises, to avoid a presumption of an
intent to grant to the tribe.
All of the old aboriginal title, navigability, and private/nonprivate grant
questions surfaced again in the Choctaw Court concurring and dissenting
opinions evaluating the majority result. They illustrate the confusion that
has resulted from the failure of the Court to construct a proper framework
for the entire issue. Justice Douglas, in concurrence, distinguished United
States v. Holt State Bank as a case involving aboriginal title, and thus not
88. See Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, 717 F.2d 1251, 1260 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
89. 397 U.S. 620 (1970).
90. The disputed portion extended from the Arkansas River's confluence with the Grand River in
Oklahoma, where the Arkansas first becomes navigable, to the western border of Arkansas. The
Cherokees claimed under a patent granting them the land on both sides of the Arkansas River, from
Grand River to its conjunction with the Canadian River. From the Canadian River to the Arkansas
border, the Arkansas River divides the Cherokee land from the Choctaw-Chickasaw land. This section
of the river was claimed by tribes on both sides. Oklahoma claimed the entire river bed under the equal
footing doctrine. Choctaw, 397 U.S. at 643-44.
91. Id. at 629-30.
92. Id. at 631.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 636-37.
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applicable to a dispute over patent land. 95 Justice White, on the other hand,
in an extensive dissent, reviewed the effect on title of the distinction
between navigable and nonnavigable river beds. 96 Justice White expressed
concern with putting navigable lands into "private hands," since these
rivers were a public resource.97 Justice White did not find the grant
sufficient to overcome the Shively presumption in favor of transferring title
to the state.98 Justice White dismissed Brewer, on which Justice Douglas
had relied, 99 as not concerning navigable waters. 100
The Ninth Circuit foreshadowed Choctaw in 1942 in Montana Power Co.
v. Rochester. 101 In Rochester, the Ninth Circuit also implicitly reversed the
equal footing doctrine's presumption of state ownership. The Court held
that Congress had made no showing in the treaty of an intent to reserve for
the state the submerged land under a lake. 102 On the other hand, the treaty
explicitly mentioned the lake because the boundary bisected it on an east-
west line. 103 The Rochester court found that the lake bed was held in trust
for the tribe. 104
The Supreme Court, as with the other elements of the submerged lands
title question, has not adhered to or refined the blanket exception to the
equal footing doctrine for Indian treaties. In a separate line of cases, the
Court has looked instead for an express grant of the submerged lands as an
indication of a Congressional finding that a public purpose existed for the
grant. Few treaties have been litigated that specifically contain grants to
navigable water beds. 105 When a treaty referred to a specific waterway, as in
Rochester, the reference was usually to a reservation boundary.
95. Id. at 638-39 (Douglas, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 644-48 (White, J. , joined by Burger, C.LJ, and Black, J., dissenting). A major flaw in the
majority opinion is the superficial discussion of navigability. The United States traditionally retains a
navigable servitude on navigable waters. The most recent case on reservation submerged lands,
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), devotes considerable energy rectifying this oversight,
to the detriment of its analysis of the other issues involved. See infra notes 194-203 and accompanying
text.
97. Choctaw, 397 U.S. at 652.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 632.
100. Id. at 651.
101. 127 F2d 189 (9th Cir. 1942).
102. Rochester, 127 F.2d at 192.
103. Id. at 190 n.3.
104. Id. at 191 (citing Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918); Donnelly v.
United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913); Taylorv. United States, 44 F.2d 531(9th Cir. 1930)). The Courtdid
not cite Holt Bank.
105. For one of the few examples of a specific grant, see United States v. Stotts, 49 F.2d 619, 621
(W.D. Wash. 1930). See infra note 131.
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b. Express Grant
United States v. Holt State Bank'0 6 originated the "express purpose"
theory. It involved the Mud Lake Indian Reservation, an area exceeding
three million acres. This reservation in Minnesota was apparently estab-
lished by default, a result of all the other Chippewa land having been ceded
away. 107 Because of this origin, no formal declaration of Indian rights in the
reservation ever arose, and thus the conflict between the equal footing
doctrine and "express purpose" treaty construction was not squarely before
the Court. 108 Nonetheless, the Court emphatically searched for "express
purpose" in express congressional intent. The Court recognized the reser-
vation's existence, but observed that no evidence overcame the presumption
of transfer to the state. 109 The Court noted that the remaining lands had not
been formally set apart, no affirmative declaration of the rights of the tribe
to the unceded lands had been made, nor had the tribe attempted to exclude
others from the use of navigational waters. 110 With no evidence to the
contrary, the Court ruled for the state.'l' Here the Court chose not to
mention Alaska Pacific Fisheries. 112
Since the tribe's claim was by aboriginal title, "13 and not by treaty, Holt
Bank could have been distinguished from earlier cases involving treaties.
By not mentioning them, the Court set the stage for later confusion over the
continued applicability of these earlier cases. Despite its "no-treaty" fact
pattern, Holt Bank's "express purpose" analysis has been cited as control-
ling precedent in cases involving treaty reservations. 114 If the Supreme
106. 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
107. Holt Bank, 270 U.S. at 58.
108. In 1890, President Harrison signed a bill authorizing the federal government to dispose of the
remaining land, with the proceeds to go to the tribe. Id. at 52. An area known as Mud Lake was drained
and prepared for sale. The state claimed the land as underlying navigable waters. Id. at 54.
109. Id. at 58.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 59. The Court noted that if the bed of Mud Lake had been given to the tribe, 800 square
miles, including two large lakes and several navigable streams, would similarly have been granted. This
would have substantially complicated the economic situation, since the federal government was in the
process of selling all the tribal land. The government would have had to compensate the tribe for the land
and then transfer it to the state at great expense. By holding that the state had title, the Court reached the
same practical outcome-state ownership-without a substantial payment to the disbanding tribe.
112. Alaska Pacific Fisheries had established a blanket exception approach. See supra notes 83-87
and accompanying text.
113. See Choctaw, 397 U.S. at 639 (Douglas, J., concurring). For a discussion of aboriginal title,
see supra Part I.A.
114. Although the Holt Bank Court explicitly stated that the reservation was not formally created
by treaty, 270 U.S. at 58, later cases have referred to the Holt Bank reservation as treaty-created. E.g.,
Montana, 450 U.S. at 552-53. Justice Blackman asserted in dissent that Holt Bank did not involve a
formal reservation, and therefore it did not control in Montana. Id. at 580 n.17 (Blackmun, J..
dissenting).
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Court in Holt Bank had clearly stated the relationship between the differing
issues in the earlier cases, 115 later courts would not have been forced to
reinterpret the issue. As recently as 1980 members of the Supreme Court
were still in sharp disagreement over the meaning of the Holt Bank
opinion. 116
This 1980 case, Montana v. United States, 117 is the most recent major
opinion on the issue of title to submerged lands. It followed the perceived
requirement 1 8 for an explicit exception to the equal footing doctrine, as
expressed in Holt Bank. Montana concerned ownership of the Big Horn
River.' 19 The Big Horn flows through the reservation but was not men-
tioned in the treaty. This fact pattern essentially paralleled the situation in
Choctaw, where the treaty had not specifically mentioned the Arkansas
River. 120 The Choctaw Court had easily disposed of the title question in one
paragraph, holding that the title was in the tribe. 121
The Montana Court, however, held that navigability created a strong
presumption against transference to anyone other than the state. 122 The
treaty stipulation that no one "shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle
upon, or reside in" the reservation was not strong enough to overcome the
presumption against the sovereign's conveyance of the river bed to the
state. 123 Since no language in the treaty explicitly conveyed the river bed,
the treaty did not defeat the presumption of the equal footing doctrine;
therefore title went to the state. 124
Although the Montana Court admitted that establishing a reservation
could be a public purpose sufficient to satisfy the Shively requirement, the
115. Those cases included Donnelly, Alaska Pacific Fisheries, Brewer, and United States v.
Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905), which is explored infra, notes 146-54 and accompanying text.
116. Compare Montana, 450 U.S. at 552-53 (Holt Bank applies to treaty reservation) with id. at
580-81 (Blackman, L, dissenting in part) (Holt Bank does not apply to treaty reservation); and
Choctaw, 397 U.S. at 634 (HoltBank does not preclude treaty interpretation) with id. at 639 (Douglas,
J., concurring) (Holt Bank only applies to aboriginal title) and with id. at 647-48 (White, J., dissenting)
(Holt Bank applies to treaty tribes and does not allow a general exception to the equal footing doctrine
for tribes).
117. 450 U.S. 544 (1980).
118. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
119. Montana, 450 U.S. at 553. The Yellowstone River was mentioned in the treaty, but the rights
to it were not at issue.
120. Id. at 575 (Blackman, J., dissenting) (pointing out the similarity to Choctaw).
121. Choctaw, 397 U.S. at 628. In Choctaw, the Court apparently thought that the question of title
in these circumstances was settled.
122. Montana, 450 U.S. at 552-53.
123. Id. at 553-54.
124. Id. at 556-57. In a footnote, the Montana Court distinguished Choctaw as based on "very
peculiar circumstances," and as a "singular exception" to the established line of cases. Id. at 555 n.5.
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Court distinguished Alaska Pacific Fisheries as presenting a "public ex-
igency" not present in the instant case. 125 What exactly that "public
exigency" was, and how the situation in Montana was different, the Court
did not make clear. 126
The concurring and dissenting opinions typify the Court's lingering
inability to handle the precedent. Justice Stevens noted in concurrence that
the dissent read Choctaw as establishing for Indian reservations a blanket
exception to the requirement for clear language to rebut a presumption in
favor of the state. 127 Stevens, however, interpreted Holt Bank as "unan-
imously and unequivocally" holding that the state title presumption applies
to reservation land, negating any blanket exception. 128 He failed, however,
to note that Holt Bank did not involve a treaty-created reservation.
Justice Blackmun argued in the Montana dissent that Choctaw should
control, because the state claim in Montana was almost identical to that in
Choctaw. 129 The dissent rejected the Montana majority's characterization
of Choctaw's "peculiar circumstances." 130 Instead, the dissent described
Holt Bank as the "singular exception" to the established line of cases, 131
distinguishing it as a case not involving a formal treaty. Although the
125. Id. at 556.
126. The Alaska Pacific Fisheries Court held that the signing of the treaty to make a reservation was
sufficent to satisfy Shively. Alaska Pac. Fisheries, 248 U.S. at 88. Treaty signing would then give rise
to a blanket exception for public exigency.
127. Montana, 450 U.S. at 567-68. Justice Stevens noted that only four justices, including Justice
Douglas, joined the majority opinion in Choctaw, and stated that he did not know how he would have
voted or whether that case would have influenced his role in the present opinion, had he been on the
Choctaw Court. Id. at 568-69.
128. Id. at 568. Although Justice Stevens indicated that the reference to Holt Bank in the Court's
opinion in Choctaw could hardly be characterized as "enthusiastic," he also noted that the Choctaw
opinion did not purport to abandon or modify Holt Bank's rule. Id. In an apparent misreading, Stevens
described Douglas' concurring opinion in Choctaw as concluding that Choctaw met the "exceptional
circumstances" required by Holt Bank. Id. Justice Douglas, in Choctaw, clearly distinguished Holt
Bank as involving aboriginal title. See Choctaw, 397 U.S. at 639.
129. Montana, 450 U.S. at 580 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 574 n.9.
131. Id. at 581 n. 17. For a case finding sufficient express language, see United States v. Stotts, 49
F.2d 619 (W.D. Wash. 1930). There the district court ruled on a treaty with the Lummi Indians that
described the reservation as extending to the low tide line of the Gulf of Georgia. Id. at 620. Since the
water was tidal, navigability was not in dispute. The court held that the plain language included the tide
lands in the reservation, thus overcoming a presumption in favor ofa grant to the state. Id. at 621. This is
one of the few documents that explicitly refers to navigable water within a reservation. Perhaps the
language occurred because the reservation included water that was navigable according to the English
common law definition: water affected by tides. See generally supra Part I.B. The Stotts court, like the
Supreme Court, engaged in a selective use of precedent. The court distinguished Taylor v. United
States, 44 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 820 (1931), and Holt Bank as lacking
language specific enough to overcome the presumption in favor of the state. Stotts, 49 F 2d at 621.
Winans and Alaska Pacific Fisheries, which would have supported the court's holding, albeit not under
the "express purpose" doctrine, were not mentioned. See infra note 170 for further discussion of Taylor.
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Montana majority appeared to require express language from Congress in
the treaties to show that the Shively "public purpose" requirement had been
considered, it also reflected hints of yet a third approach to the issue. 132
Where a court discerns no language of express grant in the treaty, it may
nonetheless go one step further to discover congressional intent: the court
may search for an implicit reading of the treaty parties' understanding. The
Montana Court expressly found that the Crows were nomadic, dependent
on buffalo, and that fishing was not important to their way of life. 133 The
Court apparently utilized these facts to evaluate whether Congress intended
to grant the disputed submerged lands. The facts failed to raise the in-
ference of a grant, since the waterways did not appear to be central to the
tribe. It is by means of this approach that equal footing doctrine analysis
touches a separate doctrinal subject: Indian treaty construction.
D. Treaty Construction
The interpretation of treaties is a fundamental aspect of Indian law. 134
The canons of construction direct that Indian treaties be interpreted in a way
that the Indians would have understood them, 135 all doubt be resolved in
favor of the tribes, 136 and doubts be resolved in a manner that furthers the
purpose of the creation of reservations. 137 The government is held to a very
high standard of dealing. 138 The underlying rationale is that the treaty
process was not arm's-length bargaining between equals; it was instead
similar to an adhesion contract imposed on the tribe, which often had no
choice but to accept the terms. 139 Consequently, treaties are to be construed
in the manner that the Indians, who usually were English-illiterate, would
have understood them. 140 Courts first reconstruct the manner in which the
132. The first approach the Court articulated was the "blanket exception" doctrine of Alaska
Pacific Fisheries. See infra notes 155-61 and accompanying text. The second was the "express
language" doctrine necessary to infer "express purpose" derived from Holt Bank. See supra notes
106-16 and accompanying text.
133. Montana, 450 U.S. at 556. The Ninth Circuit had held below that the intent of the parties and
the circumstances surrounding the signing of the treaty were sufficient to grant the Big Horn River to the
tribe. United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 1979).
134. See generally F. COHEN, supra note 6, at 221-25; Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the
Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975).
135. Choctaw, 397 U.S. at 631.
136. Id.
137. See Alaska Pac. Fisheries, 248 U.S. at 89.
138. See F. CoHEN, supra note 6, at 220 (the trust relationship involves fiduciary duties).
139. See Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long As Water
Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How Long Is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 601, 617 (1975).
140. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371,380 (1905); accord Washington v. Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 676 (1979).
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tribes lived at the time of the treaty, and then attempt to determine the intent
of both the tribe and the government at the treaty signing. 141 The treaty is
often viewed not as a grant of rights from the government to the tribe, but
rather as a reservation of rights already possessed and not granted away. 142
The canons have been extensively used to determine the existence of water
rights. 143 When a court determines such rights, the critical element is the
tribe's relationship to the water resource, both prior to the treaty and as
intended after the signing. 144
Determinations of title to submerged lands represent further examples of
rights inadequately stated in treaties. Courts may also employ the canons of
Indian treaty construction to evaluate those rights. Shively, however, ap-
pears to require a "suitable public purpose" and an explicit congressional
intent to defeat a state claim to title under the equal footing doctrine.
Express grant language has not been required in other areas involving
Indian rights, because the Indians were unable to comprehend the treaty
language. The presence of submerged lands does not alter this rationale. If
a tribe reasonably thought that it was given the title, or the treaty indicated
the tribe's intent to use the water, then the title passed to the tribe at the
treaty-signing.
The aim of the Supreme Court, in the line of reservation submerged
lands title cases, should have been to clearly articulate whether Shively's
"express purpose" requirement, when applied to treaties, 145 could be
satisfied through interpretation of the treaty as a whole, and whether
congressional intent could be determined under the canons of Indian treaty
construction by reference to the tribe's understanding. Again, the Court has
manifested inconsistency and confusion on these questions.
The Supreme Court's first decision concerning the effect of a treaty
conflicting with the equal footing doctrine was United States v. Winans. 146
This case did not involve title to submerged lands, but rather the right to use
the waterways. In Winans, the treaty stated that the Yakima tribe had "the
right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common with
citizens of the Territory." 147 The lower court held that this gave the Indians
only the same rights as other citizens. 148 The Supreme Court reversed,
141. See Alaska Pac. Fisheries, 248 U.S. at 87; Winans, 198 U.S. at 380-81.
142. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381; accord Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. at 675.
143. See F. COHEN, supra note 6, at 575-604.
144. See Alaska Pac. Fisheries, 248 U.S. at 88-89.
145. Note that many of these treaties were signed long before Shively was decided. See infra notes
178-81 and accompanying text.
146. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
147. Winans, 198 U.S. at 378.
148. United States v. Winans, 73 F 72, 74 (C.C. Wash. 1896).
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finding that the treaty granted the Indians a permanent servitude. 149
A significant portion of the opinion dealt with the Yakima tribe's under-
standing of what the treaty meant, 150 in keeping with the canons of Indian
treaty construction. The Court observed that, at the time of the treaty, the
Yakimas' right to fish was "not much less necessary. . . than the atmo-
sphere they breathed." 151 Stating that treaties will be construed as reason
and justice demand, the Court held that no other conclusion would give
effect to the treaty. 152 The Court found that the grant met Shively's public
purpose requirement, since the treaty extinguished the Indian title and
opened the land for settlement. 153 The treaty imposed a servitude on the
territory against the United States and its grantees, and against the state and
its grantees. 154
The Court in Alaska Pacific Fisheries155 also sought proper resolution of
title through treaty construction. 156 Congressional intent was to be deter-
mined by examining the circumstances surrounding the reservation's crea-
tion. 157 The reservation's purpose was essential for assessing whether or not
the grant included the navigable water. 158 The Court held that establishing
the reservation for "safe-guarding and advancing a dependent Indian
people dwelling within the United States" met the Shively test for recog-
nized public purpose. 159 Much of the opinion is a description of the lifestyle
of the Indians. 160 Since the submerged lands were essential to the Indians'
lifestyle, and hence the reservation's purpose, the Court concluded that
149. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381. The river banks and bed in question were not on the reservation,
hence the tribe was given a servitude, not the title. Although the non-Indian owner of the land in
question had a clear patent title from the United States government, and the locusin quo was on the bank




153. Id. at 384. This early application of Shively and the equal footing doctrine should have been
controlling in later cases that considered the same issue. For the most part Winans was not even cited,
much less followed. See supra notes 83-100, 106-33 and accompanying text; infra notes 155-65 and
accompanying text.
154. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381-82.
155. 248 U.S. 78 (1918).
156. Alaska Pac. Fisheries, 248 U.S. at 87. The Court was willing to concede a blanket Shively
public purpose exception to treaty grants if in fact Congress intended to include the waterbeds in the
treaty.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 89.
159. Id. at 88.
160. See id. at 88-89.
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Congress intended to include the submerged lands in the grant to the
tribe. 161
Similarly, citing Alaska Pacific Fisheries, Justice Marshall said in Choc-
taw162 that the question was one of treaty interpretation. 163 Choctaw is
perhaps the high-water mark of the Court's consideration of both the
circumstances surrounding a signing and the intent of the signers of the
treaty. The Court found persuasive the clause "no part of the land granted to
them shall ever be embraced in any Territory."l 164 Justice Douglas' con-
currence was an extensive review of the conditions surrounding the making
of the treaty and the signers' intent. 165
The Ninth Circuit adheres to broad treaty construction principles as well.
In Moore v. United States, 166 no explicit language granted the river bed to
the tribe. Nonetheless, the court decided that the treaty did award control of
the bed of the Quillayute River and tidelands to the tribe. 167 The court found
that Congress intended tribal ownership, citing the Alaska Pacific Fisheries
opinion. 168 Determinative factors were the fishing practices of the tribe at
the time of the treaty and intended future commercial development. 169 The
court found it necessary to distinguish Holt Bank's factual evidence. 170
161. Id. at 89-90. A possible distinguishing characteristic of this case is that the territory had not
yet been granted statehood at the time of the opinion. The Court does mention that this was not "a
private grant, but simply a setting apart, 'until otherwise provided by law,'. . for a recognized public
purpose"; i.e., the advancement of the Indian people. Id. at 88. The Court did not dwell upon pre-
statehood status, and this factor has not been used to distinguish the case in subsequent decisions.
162. 397 U.S. 620 (1970).
163. Choctaw 397 U.S. at 631 (citing Alaska Pac. Fisheries, 248 U.S. at 89).
164. Choctaw, 397 U.S. at 635.
165. Id. at 636-43 (Douglas, J., concurring). The dissent in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.
544 (1980), also focused on circumstances at the time of the treaty, the intent of the treaty signers, and
the Indians' understanding of the treaty's meaning. Id. at 569-79 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
Blackmun concluded by saying that the majority opinion had blinded itself to the circumstances of the
grant in determining the intent of the grantor. Id. at 580.
166. 157 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 827 (1947).
167. Moore, 157 F.2d at 765.
168. Id. at 762.
169. Id. One-fourth of the opinion was an historical review of the dependency of the Quillayute on
fish, both for food and commercial use. See id. at 762-63.
170. The Moore court distinguished Holt Bank, where the absence of a treaty had defeated tribal
ownership, as lacking evidence of the tribe's use of the navigable waters. Id. at 765. In acknowledging
the conflict between Alaska Pacific Fisheries and Holt Bank, the court stated that Alaska Pacific
Fisheries was not mentioned in the Holt Bank opinion and "we cannot regard it as overruled sub
silentio. " Id.
The Ninth Circuit had first examined the treaty creating the Quillayute tribe reservation in Taylor v.
United States, 44 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 820 (1931). The treaty did not mention
the Quillayute River, even though the reservation's boundaries included the river. Id. at 532. The United
States sued on behalf of the tribe to stop barge owners from using the river. Id. at 531. The Ninth Circuit
held that the land had been granted to the state before the reservation was founded. Id. at 535. Moore
found this finding to be factually incorrect. Moore, 157 F.2d at 764 n.3.
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In a 1963 case, Skokomish Indian Tribe v. France,171 the Ninth Circuit
again used treaty construction priciples to affirm a district court ruling that
the title to tidelands was in the state, not the tribe. 172 The treaty described
the eastern boundary of the reservation as "along" Hood Canal. 173 The
tribe claimed ownership extending to the low tide line. Despite the ambigu-
ous language which may have included the tidelands, the district court held
that the treaty parties did not show any intent to pass title to the tidelands. 174
The appellate court independently reviewed the lifestyle of the tribe at the
time of the treaty, 175 and determined that the tribe did not use the tidelands
and had no expectation of using them. 176 Here the court felt compelled to
distinguish Alaska Pacific Fisheries. 177
Again in 1982, in Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 178
the court noted the Supreme Court's frequent admonitions to construe
treaties as the Indians would have. 179 The court agreed that Montana
established that the Supreme Court did not recognize a blanket exception to
the presumption against grants of navigable waters to reservations. 180 The
court indicated, however, that the pro-Indian rule of construction should
"weaken" that presumption, especially where, as in the instant case, the
controlling treaty was negotiated and ratified long before the presumption
arose. 181 The court noted that one of the Flathead tribes depended on
fishing. 182 The court also observed that the Office of Indian Affairs'
urgency in getting the Senate to ratify the Flathead reservation treaty
indicated that the opening of land to settlers was perceived as a "public
171. 320 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 943 (1964).
172. Skokomish, 320 F2d at 210.
173. Id. at 207.
174. Id. at 210.
175. Id. at 210-12.
176. Id.
177. The court distinguished Alaska Pacific Fisheries, since the tidelands there were essential to
the purpose of the treaty, and therefore Congress must have intended to include them. Id. at 212. Citing
Holt Bank, the court in Skokomish found that the documents and historical background material did not
manifest an intention of the treatymakers to include the tideland in the grant. Id. at 213. An interesting
ground for distinguishing this case fromMoore and Montana Power Co. v. Rochester, 127 E2d 189 (9th
Cir. 1942), is that the water in Skokomish was tidal, and thus navigable under the traditional English
common law definition of navigability. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
178. 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 977 (1982).
179. Confederated Salish, 665 F.2d at 962 (citing five Supreme Court opinions, all decided in the
1970's).
180. Id. at 962 n.29.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 962.
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exigency" in the 1850's. 183 Thus the Shively requirement for a private grant
was satisfied.
The Ninth Circuit continued to regard the interpretation of treaty circum-
stances as of primary importance in Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of
Tacoma. 184 Puyallup involved land that was uncovered when a river was
rerouted. The State of Washington took possession and built waterfront
facilities on some of the land, selling the rest for private development. 185
The tribe sued to quiet title. Despite the fact that the Puyallup River was not
specifically mentioned in the creation of the reservation, 186 the court,
applying Montana, held that the tribe had title to the bed of the river. 187 The
court concluded that if the government was plainly aware of the importance
of submerged lands to the tribe at the time of the treaty, then the plain
meaning requirement of Holt Bank was satisfied. 188 The court gave weight
to the fact that Choctaw's receptive attitude to treaty interpretation had not
been rejected in Montana. 189
These cases show the process by which the canons of Indian treaty
construction may be incorporated into the process of equal footing doctrine
analysis. Once again, however, the cases are not uniform or clear on the
point.
The historical sticking point continues to be the Holt Bank "express
purpose" requirement. 90 Wherever political expediency or factual com-
plexity make a decision in favor of Indian rights undesirable, the courts tend
to reach back to Holt Bank' 91 and ignore the Winans-Chocktaw line of
cases. Montana, 192 as the currently controlling reservation submerged
lands decision, relied heavily on Holt Bank in approaching the treaty in
dispute with an eye to language of express grant. Yet Montana did not
overrule Choctaw. Nor did it totally ignore treaty conditions at the time of
making. 193 As a result, the extent to which treaty construction remains a
viable tool to prove congressional intent remains in doubt.
183. Id.
184. 717 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
185. Puyallup, 717 F.2d at 1254; Homeowners are Enraged by Tribe's Eviction Threat, Seattle
Post-lntelligencer, Aug. 22, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
186. Although not explicitly stated by the court, the absence of language to that effect can be
inferred from the court's analysis of the issue. Puyallup, 717 F.2d at 1256-61.
187. Id. at 1262.
188. Id. at 1258.
189. Id. at 1257.
190. 270 U.S. 49 (1926). See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
191. See infra notes 199-200 and accompanying text.
192. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
193. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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II. INDIAN RIGHTS TO SUBMERGED LANDS: MODERN
ANALYSIS
A. Critique of the Montana Decision
Where does the issue of title to submerged lands stand? If the body of
water over the submerged lands was specifically mentioned in the treaty,
which appears to have happened only when the waterway was a boundary or
was outside the reservation, 194 the tribe can claim title under the express
grant theory. However, actual mention in the treaty may not always be
necessary. 195 The language requirement after Montana is not clear. Neither
Montana nor the earlier Choctaw decision specifically overruled or ade-
quately reconciled the contrary precedent.
In its rush to reaffirm the existence of a distinction based on navigability,
the Montana Court neglected the basic tenets of Indian treaty construc-
tion. 196 The Court ignored Winans and Alaska Pacific Fisheries, 197 in
which it had considered the same issues. It also inadequately distinguished
Choctaw, in which almost identical issues were considered only ten years
before. 198
The Montana Court's reliance on Holt Bank as controlling precedent was
also misplaced. 199 To insist that Holt Bank established a clear language
requirement for grants to tribes exceeds the case's precedential value. Holt
Bank is the only submerged lands case in which the reservation was not
explicitly recognized by treaty. 200
To now require, as Montana apparently does, that treaties must contain
language showing intent to reserve the beds in order for the tribes to have
194. See infra note 201.
195. This was the case in Puyallup, 717 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049
(1984). See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 134-44 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 146-61 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 89-100 and accompanying text.
199. In Holt Bank, the government never explicitly agreed to the reservation. The land in question
was in the process of sale to private buyers. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 106-16 and accompanying text. The Montana dissent's use of precedent was
also flawed. The dissent's reliance on Brewer, Donnelly, Alaska Pacific Fisheries, and Choctaw was not
as solid as the dissent believed. Alaska Pacific Fisheries did not involve a conflict between a state and a
reservation, and thus can be read as leaving the state's rights question open. See supra note 161. Brewer
and Donnelly were nonnavigability cases. See supra notes 61, 66 and accompanying text. Although the
two opinions may contain relevant dicta, these cases should not be cited as controlling in situations that
do involve navigable waters. Finally, Choctaw itself did not adequately address the issue of navigability.
See supra note 96. In this respect it presents unreliable precedent. The navigability distinction has been




title is disingenuous at best, 20 1 given the Indians' unequal bargaining
position and congressional ignorance of requirements that would mate-
rialize decades later. If the Montana Court intended to create an "express
purpose" exception to the "surrounding circumstances" rule of treaty
interpretation for navigable water, 202 the Court should have been more
explicit. A more likely explanation, however, is that Montana is simply
another Indian law case that was decided on its own facts and exigencies,
without full treatment of lines of precedent necessary to shape future
decisions.203
B. Reconciliation
The history of title rights to beds of navigable waters on Indian lands is
the story of two distinct doctrines, the proper blending of which the Court
has never quite adequately achieved. Donnelly and Brewer were decided on
the issue of nonnavigability.20 4 Winans, Alaska Pacific Fisheries, and
Choctaw were decided on the basis of an implicit treaty grant, using Indian
law principles of interpretation. 20 5 Holt Bank and Montana were decided
on the basis of explicit intent requirements of the equal footing doctrine of
water law.206 The Court has not dealt with the possible contradictions of
Indian law and water law in determination of title to submerged lands on
reservations. Consequently no clear "law" on the issue has emerged. 207
The reconciliation of water law and Indian law derives from exploring the
underlying policy reasons of each doctrine. If the rationale behind the equal
footing doctrine is understood, and the unique position of Indian tribes is
kept in mind, the two doctrines are easily reconciled. The purpose of the
clear language exception to the equal footing doctrine set forth in Shively is
to insure that navigable waterways remain in the control of a sovereign
201. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 577. The result is also absurd in practice. For example, in Montana
the Big Horn River, flowing through the middle of the reservation, was not specifically mentioned in the
treaty, so the court held that the tribe did not have title. On the other hand, the Yellowstone River was
mentioned, merely because the boundary of the reservation was the "mid-channel of the Yellowstone
River." Id. at 553 n.4. Under the Montana rationale, the tribe must have title to half the bed.
202. The HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW suggests this interpretation. F. COHEN, supra note 6,
at 503-04.
203. This tendency has been noted in other areas of Indian law. See Barsh, Review of Recent Indian
Law, 59 WASH. L. REv. 863, 863-64 (1984). Barsh, in analyzing the Court's 1982 term, said that "it is
doubtful whether the recent judicial record concerning Indian affairs merits categorization as 'law."'
Id. at 863.
204. See supra notes 60-69.
205. See supra notes 50-68.
206. See supra notes 101-33.
207. See supra note 203.
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entity; if not the federal government, then the state government. Shively set
out the purpose behind the navigable waters doctrine almost a century ago:
Lands under tide waters are incapable of cultivation or improvement in the
manner of lands above high water mark. They are of great value to the public
for the purposes of commerce, navigation and fishery. Their improvement by
individuals, when permitted, is incidental or subordinate to the public use and
right. Therefore the title and the control of them are vested in the sovereign for
the benefit of the whole people. 208
Indian tribes, however, are also sovereign entities. 20 9 The Court has long
upheld this sovereignty, beginning with Worcester v. Georgia in 1832.210
Tribes' special sovereign status has been the basis of many exceptions to
laws which would otherwise be applicable. 211 Montana's requirement, that
the same standard for passing title to a private individual should also be
applied to a sovereign tribe, ignores both the purpose of the equal footing
doctrine and the unique status of the tribal entities. This requirement also
disregards the reality under which the treaties were made. It is doubtful that
any tribe understood the necessity of specifically including the beds of
navigable waters in their treaties, particularly since most reservations
predate the Shively decision.
In light of the tribes' sovereignty, the presence of a reservation should be
sufficient to justify an exception to the equal footing doctrine. In creating
the reservations, Congress set aside federally protected areas for the Indi-
ans to live free from state interference. 212 The federal trust relationship is
the core of Indian law. To allow the states to have jurisdiction over beds of
water inside a reservation violates that principle.213
Given that reservations are controlled by sovereign tribal governments,
and that the land is held in trust by the federal government for the tribe, in
the majority of cases, the policy reasons expressed in Shively would be met
by allowing the tribes to retain the traditional Indian title. Location of
submerged lands within a reservation should create a rebuttable presump-
tion of tribal title, as the Ninth Circuit held in Rochester.2 4 The public
208. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894).
209. Thus, the grant is not "private." See supra note 87.
210. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).Accord United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975) (upholding
sovereignty status).
211. See F. COHEN, supra note 6, at 246-57 and 324-28.
212. The earliest cases on Indian law concern state interference. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
213. Nor is the policy underlying the special status of navigable waters furthered by denying Indian
jurisdiction. Most tribes can prudently manage that resource. See generally F. COHEN, supra note 6.
214. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text. The presumption could be rebutted with
evidence that, as per the canons of treaty construction, the Indians did not need or intend for the water
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interest in navigable waterways would be further protected, since in a
majority of cases the tribe would only be granted the right of occupancy
title; the fee would still be held in trust by the federal government. 215 Thus,
in rare situations such as Holt Bank, where the reservation land base is sold
or granted to private ownership, the federal government could transfer the
title of the submerged lands to the state. 216
To recognize a rebuttable presumption in favor of grants to reservations
based on implicit treaty intent would satisfy the purposes of both the equal
footing doctrine-keeping title to navigable water out of private hands-
and federal Indian treaties-protecting Indian tribes from state inter-
ference. The recognition of a presumption in favor of tribal ownership
would accomplish a number of other objectives as well: (1) by reconciling
the prior cases, it would give clear guidance to lower courts; (2) it would
establish "law" for this question; and (3) not inconsequently, it would also
be more reasonable, fair, and just, thus helping reduce the gap between
Indians' theoretical and practical rights.
III. CONCLUSION
A fundamental characteristic of law is that it provides a clear, predicta-
ble, analytical path to resolve a dispute. The courts have not provided a
clear, predictable analysis in determining questions of title for submerged
lands on Indian reservations. Once the issues and cases involved are
explored, it is possible to lay out a framework in which questions of title to
submerged lands can be clearly, fairly and predictably answered.
The first question to be resolved is whether the tribe has a claim based on
aboriginal title. If the tribe can show aboriginal title, the equal footing
doctrine is inapplicable, and the federal government never had use title to
grant or withhold from the state. In addition, the question of navigability
does not arise, since the navigation distinction does not exist with aborig-
inal title. The only issue is whether the land is within the traditional use area
of the tribe. If aboriginal use is shown, as appeared to be the case in
Montana217 and Holt Bank,218 the tribe retains use title, as "sacred as fee
simple." 21 9 If, however, as is often the case, the aboriginal title has been
extinguished by treaty or migration, then the court must continue its
analysis.
beds to be included within the reservation.
215. The federal government would, of course, retain the navigable servitude.
216. Tee-Hit-Ton, 348 U.S. 272 (1955) notwithstanding, such transfer should be contingent on the
tribe being compensated for its holdings.
217. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
1210
Vol. 61:1185, 1986
Title to Submerged Lands
If the tribe cannot show aboriginal title, the next issue to be examined is
navigability. If the water was not navigable at the time of creation of the
reservation, the title passed to the tribe. This result has been well-defined in
water law. The Indian law cases, for the most part, have analyzed the issue
responsibly.
If the water was navigable, the rules of Indian treaty interpretation
should apply. This would, in effect, create a presumption of ownership in
the tribe. The state can overcome the presumption by showing that the
treaty signers did not expect the tribe to take title. This is a heavy burden. It
is not an impossible one, however.220 This analysis is fair as well as logical,
since before the Europeans came, the Indians had use of all the land.
Having convinced the Indians to trade away the vast majority of the land in
return for "reservations," the United States can well afford to cede the title
to beds of navigable waters within these reservations. In the words of
Justice Black, "[g]reat nations, like great men, should keep their word. ",22'
Although the Supreme Court has yet to recognize aboriginal title in
determining title to submerged lands, the lower courts are beginning to do
so. If considered in conjunction with the suggested resolution of the
conflict between the equal footing doctrine and treaty interpretation, ab-
original title rights would significantly reduce the gap between Indians'
theoretical rights and those actually recognized.
Rick Best
220. If a coastal tribe claimed the seabed, for example, or if a tribe on Puget Sound in Washington
State sued to quiet title to subtidal land in the Sound. the state could undoubtedly meet its burden. See
supra notes 171-77 and accompanying text.
221. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
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